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PREFACE 
 
In world politics, it is often difficult to surpass the crisis of the day and reflect up-
on long-term trends and developments. Imagining a desired future end-state is 
even more complex, especially when current tensions and disputes seem to stand 
in the way of constructive solutions. Yet it is exactly the role of academia to un-
dertake such reflection, and to offer ambitious, creative and realistic recommenda-
tions for the grand strategies of their respective governments.  
One thing is certain: it will be the grand strategies of today’s great powers – the 
United States, China, Russia, and the European Union – that will determine the 
direction of world politics for many years to come. A great power is an actor 
whose decisions have the potential to shape global events. Other actors perhaps 
have the means, and may in the future play a bigger role than they are doing to-
day, but for the moment only these four are truly global actors. How Washington, 
Beijing, Moscow, and Brussels see the world therefore is of crucial importance for 
any student of world politics.  
The Egmont – Royal Institute for International Relations is honoured and pleased 
to have started a collaboration with the Institute of Europe of the Russian Acade-
my of Sciences, at the latter’s initiative, to study these and other issues of mutual 
interest. A first joint public publication was launched in Moscow at the occasion 
of the anniversary conference of the Institute of Europe in November 2017. This 
second joint publication follows a joint seminar in Brussels in April 2018.  
We are already looking forward to the next joint event, and hope that we have 
now established a firm basis for structural collaboration between our two insti-
tutes.  
Prof. Dr. Sven Biscop  
Director, Europe in the World Programme  
Egmont – Royal Institute  
for International Relations 
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Strategic thinking is a prerequisite for a success in world affairs of any major 
state. Of course, the latter does not have a monopoly on strategic thinking. But 
only major states, or great powers as they were used to be called, have the means 
not only to design foreign policy strategies but to implement them. A country of 
any size can play a significant role in international relations. However only a 
handful of states have a capacity to harness a full spectrum of hard and soft power 
factors, which make them trans-regional and global players. The USA, China and 
Russia are obvious members of this club. 
A success in implementing strategic thinking is not given. The whole political his-
tory is an example of the rise and fall of the great powers. Only few of them have 
managed to avoid this iron law of history and to retain their status. In the 21st cen-
tury they will be tested again by rough seas of geopolitics and their commanding 
heights will be contested by new pretenders. Among their ranks the towering posi-
tion is held by China, dwarfing in its capacity other rising powers. 
A status of a major state still is a ticking phenomenon, but new times are as de-
manding and challenging as never before. In order to sustain the status of gran-
deur an international actor should not so much impose, but attract, lead by exam-
ple and make it easier for others to cooperate with it than to oppose it. The global-
ized world has made it impossible to revive a pattern of superpowers but at the 
same time has eased restraints on claims to join the club of major states. 
There is also a unique feature of contemporary world affairs: apart from the tradi-
tional global actors – initially empires and later nation-states, the world has wit-
nessed an attempt to invent a subject of international relations of a new, suprana-
tional nature. The European Union since its inception in 1957 has grown into one 
of the leading global players. However, its ambitions still are not supported by a 
necessary strategic toolkit. At present, the EU status of a major power is more a 
derivative of the foreign policy of its leading member-states than its own suprana-
tional ability. Whether the intention of the EU to create its genuine foreign policy 
subjectivity and pursue its own global strategy can be realized – is one if the main 
intrigues of the new times. 
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These and accompanied issues are in the focus of collaboration between Institute 
of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences (IE RAS) and our distinguished 
Belgian partner the Egmont – Royal Institute for International Relations. On the 
following pages we are happy to present our second joint addition based on the 
Seminar, organized in Brussels by Egmont in April 2018. 
 
Prof. Dr. Alexey Gromyko 
Corresponding member of RAS 
Director of IE RAS 
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POLITICAL LANDSCAPE OF EUROPE.  
THE SPECTRE OF GEOPOLITICAL SOLITUDE 
 
Perceptions of the main challenges to the stability of the conventional state of the 
world are changing as rapidly as the events themselves. The political establish-
ment in the United States still sets the tone in shaping these perceptions in the 
West, although the uniformity of the Euro-Atlantic region is withering away. An 
obvious example is the G7 summit in Quebec in June, which ended in fiasco with 
Donald Trump withdrawing his signature from the final communiqué. The refusal 
was accompanied by harsh criticism of Justin Trudeau, the Prime Minister of 
Canada, whom Trump accused of lying and undermining the agreements1 reached 
in La Malbaie.  
Deconstruction of the Liberal West 
The liberal part of the European political establishment continues to nourish hope 
that the current US behavior is temporary phenomenon, not a long-term trend. The 
increasing contradictions between the two shores of the Atlantic are most painful 
for orthodox Atlantists, most vocal in the Baltic states, Poland, Romania, Sweden. 
As Britain withdraws from the EU, a number of European countries aspire for 
more United States in the Old continent. However their desire is checked by a 
person who is supposed to symbolize the US – Donald Trump. So some of the 
America’s European acolytes are ready to bow their heads in acceptance even of 
this twist of history. Others view the neoliberal opposition to Trump as their mir-
ror and wait for their return. 
                                                          
1 D. Trump reacted to the statements of J. Trudeau made at a press conference after 
Trump's departure about the injustice of the US tariffs on steel and aluminum. 
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For European pragmatists represented by such countries as Germany and France, 
Spain and Belgium, the contradictions, accumulating with Washington, serve as a 
signal for more independent stance and for the transformation of the EU into an 
autonomous player on the international scene. Berlin and Paris, supported by 
Rome, are pursuing a proactive policy of developing the military-political instru-
ments of the EU and strengthening the capacity of the national military-industrial 
complexes. 
The other category of EU member states – Italy, Hungary, Greece, Slovakia, part-
ly Bulgaria and the Czech Republic – countries with strong populist movements 
and eurosceptic sentiments, are gaining more influence. The prime minister of 
Hungary Viktor Orban, assuming the post for the fourth time last May, addressed 
the Parliament stating that the era of liberal democracy had come to an end and 
called for replacing it with 21st century Christian democracy1. The confrontation 
with ideological rivals plays into his hands. The decision of the Central European 
University, sponsored by Jorge Soros, to relocate from Budapest to Vienna be-
came a symbol of this. If previously Orban was routinely portrayed by the liberal 
press as a political renegade and an outcast, now the flow of events in Europe 
shows that his personality, like many others, testifies to profound changes in the 
European thinking and reflects large-scale socio-economic changes. As a result, 
the established party political systems experienced a profound change. 
In discourse on the liberal international order and New Populism, Britain is a spe-
cial case. Its homegrown euroscepticism has gone much further than in Hungary, 
Greece or Italy. It not only brought eurosceptics to power, but also caused a polit-
ical earthquake in the form of Brexit. However, the country's political elite, in 
spite of all its connivance to populism and strategic miscalculation, continues to 
portray itself as a genuine pillar of the liberal international order. To make these 
mutually exclusive attitudes – the exit from the EU and leading positions in the 
Euro-Atlantic region, the British authorities have been engaged in incredible ad-
venturism, including the Skripal case. Despite all the differences, the nature of 
populism in Britain is largely the same as in the US, Italy, France or Germany – 
the protracted stagnation in the middle-class income and the increase of social in-
equality. For example, according to the British Trade Union Congress, after the 
2008௅2009 world economic crisis the average real wages of British workers re-
                                                          
1 ITAR-TASS. The era of liberal democracy has come to an end – the Hungarian Prime 
Minister. May 10, 2018. 
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main lower than 10 years ago, and will not return to the pre-crisis level until 
20251. 
The Advent of New Populism 
New Populism has ceased to be a marginal phenomenon and has turned into a 
mainstream one. Euroscepticism, one of its currents, which until recently was an 
abusive term, now is an official policy of forces at the helm of power.  The new 
prime minister of Italy Giuseppe Conte is at the head of the first Italian entirely 
populist government, formed by representatives of the Five Star Movement and 
the League. This government is unique in bringing together left and right popu-
lism, the genesis of which is very different, but the approaches to solving a num-
ber of transnational problems are similar. The concept of empire2 was once reha-
bilitated in the Western historical and political literature to the extent of the rheto-
ric of “benevolent empire”, especially in the US. At present the notion of “popu-
lism” is being rehabilitated as well. This is exactly what G. Conte stated in the 
Senate of the Italian Parliament on 5 June, indicating that the new government has 
nothing against being called populist in case it means respecting the views of the 
citizens. 
Indeed, populism in the traditional meaning is the preserve of small parties and, 
consequently, of small groups of population. However, almost 50% of the citi-
zens, who came to the polling stations at the election on 4 March, voted for the 
“Five Stars” and the League, which converted to a substantial majority of man-
dates in the parliament. In Italy and in a growing number of other European states 
New Populism becomes the pool of opinions expressed by the majority or a sig-
nificant part of the population. As a result the former mainstream parties trade 
places with their opponents, thus becoming populist themselves and yielding 
mainstream ground to the new opinion formers. 
Populism in the traditional meaning is a negative phenomenon, mapping the way 
for demagogues. On the contrary, many movements of New Populism contribute 
more to apprehension and resolution of modern crisis than the conventional ruling 
parties. For example, the emphasis on pragmatism in solving the problems of un-
                                                          
1 ITAR-TASS. In London, several tens of thousands of people showed up at the rally in 
support of the workers' rights. May 12, 2018. 
2 Niall Ferguson. Empire: How Britain Made the Modern World. Penguin, 2003. 
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controlled migration or improving relations with Russia appears to be more re-
sponsible and promising for stabilizing the situation in Europe, than the position 
of traditional centrist forces on these issues. Therefore, the arguments of those 
who accuse Russia of sympathizing with mainstream currents of New Populism 
allegedly with the aim to split up the EU, are not convincing. In fact, the reverse is 
true: Russia is at loggerheads with the British conservatives, who are main con-
tributors to undermining European integration. 
New Populism is often compared to and associated with the interwar years popu-
lism in the 20th century, which made it easier for the World War II to happen. Of 
course, there are ultra-right parties in Europe, and some of them embrace neo-
Nazi ideology. But they do not fall under the category of New Populism. Moreo-
ver, they continues to maintain their marginal character. The political heights are 
contended by those, for whom national identity, not nationalism is a means to 
overhaul the European project, to solve, not to aggravate the problems of demo-
cratic deficit, social inequalities, national and supranational bureaucracies, feeble-
ness of the EU foreign policy. Majority of those, who represent New Populism, 
oppose the use of military force abroad, “humanitarian” and regime change inter-
ventions, while defenders of the “liberal international order” usually initiate or 
participate in application of hard power, from sanctions of different kinds to mili-
tary force. The policies of conventional ruling parties, not those of the new popu-
lists, failed to prevent the migration crisis and, in some cases, have made it worse. 
As a result, we have the rise of xenophobic and racist attitudes in Europe. 
Populism is a neutral phenomenon in the sense that the public frustration can be 
directed in different directions. Populism itself is neither negative, nor positive; it 
is a resource that may be used to implement either progressive or destructive po-
litical projects. The populism of British eurosceptics has dilapidated consequenc-
es, either visible or hidden, both for the European integration project, and for the 
international standing of Britain. At the same time, the populism of the “Five 
Stars”, The League or Viktor Orban is also a reaction to various dysfunctions, 
both at the national and the EU levels, but it does not go as far as the British euro-
sceptics. The dissatisfaction of the voters, whose aspirations are the prerequisite 
for the electoral success, can ultimately benefit the EU, forcing the conventional 
political parties either to adapt and metamorphose or to give way to new political 
forces.  
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The success or failure in this self-transformation or self-annihilation of political 
establishments will be determined by two more issues. Firstly, they will be judged 
by the ability to implement the EU Global Strategy, in particular, the thesis of 
strategic autonomy. The second issue is the normalization of relations with Russia 
and the revival of the concept of strategic partnership between the West and the 
East of Europe from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean. 
There is one more group of countries – Finland, Sweden, Austria and Switzerland, 
which adhere to different variations of neutrality. They have played an important 
role in the modern history of Europe as elements of checks and balances, which 
support peace in this versatile region. They have made a significant contribution 
to the de-escalation of various conflicts. The special role of neutrality was demon-
strated during the visit of Vladimir Putin to Vienna in June, where the two coun-
tries signed an unprecedented agreement on the Russian gas supplies up to 2040. 
The federal chancellor Sebastian Kurz and Austrian president Alexander Van der 
Bellen made statements, which in effect run counter to the official policy of 
Washington and some of its allies towards Russia. However, Helsinki, and espe-
cially Stockholm have become a weak link in European neutrality. The sustained 
efforts of the USA to draw Finland and Sweden into NATO, if not de jure, then de 
facto, are by no means accidental. The next step in this direction was the signing 
on 8 May in Washington of a trilateral declaration on expanding military coopera-
tion between the United States, Sweden and Finland. Prior to this, in 2016, both 
North European countries had already concluded similar bilateral agreements with 
the United States. 
The Euro-Atlantic solidarity is cracking at the seams. That makes the member 
states of the EU and its supranational structures review their strategic priorities 
and prepare backstop options. One of them was expressed in a statement in favor 
of normalizing relations with Russia, made by Jean-Claude Juncker, the President 
of the European Commission, at the conference “Re-energizing Europe – Now!” 
on 31 May. The conference was the concluding event of a major project, involv-
ing a number of leading European think tanks1. Growing geopolitical solitude of 
the EU is pushing the national capitals and Brussels towards revival of the im-
perative of the pan-European security system and common economic and humani-
tarian space from Lisbon to Vladivostok.  
                                                          
1 www.newpactforeurope.eu. 
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Transactional Relations 
The dreams of the orthodox Atlantists for preserving the “liberal international or-
der” led by the United States of the pre-Trump period are becoming ever more 
intangible. It is difficult to give more convincing evidence of its malaise than the 
recognition of Donald Tusk, President of the European Council, who calls himself 
“an incurable pro-American European fanatically devoted to the idea of trans-
Atlantic cooperation”1. On the eve of the G7 summit in Canada, he was deliberat-
ing whether the new policy of the White House was merely seasonal or a symp-
tom of the breakup of the Western political community2. Shortly before the EU – 
Western Balkans summit in May, Tusk said that the EU should be grateful to 
president Trump, “because thanks to him we have got rid of all illusions”3. And, it 
should be kept in mind that Tusk is a Pole. “Euronews”, the leading news channel 
of the EU, echoing such sentiments, called the Canadian G7 summit a symbol of 
the Western world split4. A new term, “G6 plus one”, was coined, reflecting the 
further erosion of the club’s influence following the reduction of its membership 
after suspension of Russia's membership.                          
The relationship between the US and its allies in Europe increasingly resembles 
the transactional type of interaction, a notion from the world of finance that means 
a concrete one-time deal. Until recently it was broadly used in the West to charac-
terize the relations with Russia since 2014. In other words, it is a targeted coop-
eration on agreements, , which the West is interested to strike with Russia, for ex-
ample, the settlement of the Syrian and Ukrainian crises, the salvation of the Iran 
nuclear deal, some elements of the fight against international terrorism. This type 
of relationship was officially embodied in the “five guiding principles for EU-
Russia relations”, adopted by the Council of the EU in March 2016. These days, 
                                                          
1 The European Council is the highest political body of the European Union; consists of 
heads of state and government of the EU member states. 
2 Donald Tusk. Despite Trump, the West Must Stay United. New York Times, 6 June, 
2018. 
3 ITAR-TASS. Pulse of the planet. Europe. The EU should be prepared for the negative 
consequences of the US withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal, ௅ Tusk. May 16, 2018. 
4 http://ru.euronews.com/2018/06/11/g7-end-multilateralism 
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the cooperation between the leader of the Western world with its other representa-
tives is becoming transactional as well. 
Trump's way of thinking represents the strategy of a business manager, who pri-
marily is interested in the profitability of the enterprise. To be more precise, that is 
a type of a profitability associated with the principles of shareholders' economy 
(the interests of a narrow group of people focused on short-term benefits) in con-
trast with stakeholders’ economy. The shareholders for Trump the President is his 
electorate and the interests of Trump’s opponents and other members of the West-
ern community become irrelevant. Trump offers a type of a business model, , 
which envisages taking into account as much interests of the US allies as is ac-
ceptable for the America’s national interests, interpreted through a prism of 
Trump’s election promises. And most of them are interpreted in a narrow econo-
my-centered context.  
 
* * * 
 
The political landscape of Europe is undergoing profound change. The drama of 
Brexit, the US withdrawal from the climate accord and Iran nuclear deal, the fias-
co of the G7 summit in Quebec, the intensifying trade war between the US and the 
EU, a new populist government, this time in Italy, the Catalan and Scottish sepa-
ratisms, the EU internal quarrels on migration, the success of “Nord Stream 2” are 
symptoms of deep shifts in international relations. In general, the ongoing events 
confirm the emergence of the polycentric model of global governance. They also 
point to growing awareness in the EU of the need of strategic autonomy. The Rus-
sian foreign policy acquires more space for maneuvering in different geopolitical 
directions.  
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Marc FRANCO 
 
 
DEADLOCK OF EU௅RUSSIA RELATIONS.  
WHAT NEXT? 
At present the relations between the European Union (EU) and Russia are below 
freezing point and deteriorating rather than improving. This situation is detri-
mental for either side and not sustainable. Neither in geopolitics nor in real life 
can one live in permanent conflict with one’s neighbour. Cooperation is necessary 
in various domains: in the economic sphere as well as for security against outside 
threats, fight against organised crime, trafficking etc. Constructive economic co-
operation would allow a development of the synergies between a developed and 
an emerging market economy and the optimal use of the complementarities be-
tween natural, human and technical resources of EU and Russia. Moreover, a 
market of more than 600 million consumers would allow the realisation of signifi-
cant economies of scale. 
Whatever position one adopts in the present conflict, the outcome is a loss-loss 
result for both sides. Moreover, the longer the conflict lasts, the more future coop-
eration is jeopardised as both sides get further estranged from each other and de-
velop other economic and political alliances.   
Recently the EU has extended the various “EU restrictive measures” or sanctions 
against the Russian Federation in response to the crisis in Ukraine. These restric-
tive measures were progressively adopted in response to the “illegal annexation of 
Crimea and the deliberate destabilisation of Ukraine”. They consist of diplomatic 
measures, individual restrictive measures and economic sanctions. The Russian 
Federation has responded with an entry ban on certain politicians and an embargo 
on the imports of agricultural products. For the Russian Federation the lifting of 
the sanctions and the normalisation of relations is conditioned upon the lifting of 
the EU sanctions.  The EU has aligned the economic sanctions regime to the com-
plete implementation of the Minsk agreements. Within the EU, a growing number 
of governments argue for lifting of sanction, but up till now the consensus around 
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the “five guiding principles for EU-Russia relations”1 adopted in March 2016 has 
been maintained. At present the easing of tensions seems unlikely, the Scripal poi-
soning and the incidents in Syria adding to the list of issues that divide EU and 
Russia. 
Increasingly, the political standoff is complicated by the evolution of the public 
opinion. The list of contentious issues is long (Crimea, Donbas, the downing of 
MH17, cyberattacks, interference in elections, Scripal, Syria etc.) and the official 
versions are not only different, but totally contradictory. Official versions on ei-
ther side are by and large taken over by the media with few dissenting voices. Di-
verging opinions are on either side considered fake news or propaganda and 
measures are taken to respond to the “disinformation”. Biased information, accu-
sation based on flimsy evidence, denials that lack substance and credibility make 
it difficult to organise a reasonable discussion on the real situation and the respec-
tive responsibilities. No constructive dialogue is possible at this stage as official 
communication is dominated by parallel monologues, yes-no arguments and 
“what-about-ism”. The official positions backed up by the narrative from the me-
dia have been increasingly taken over by public opinion. Old Cold War attitudes 
have returned: Russian public opinion sees the West as unfriendly force, decided 
to subdue Russia and rob it of its legitimate place in the global geopolitical. Even 
EU friendly people tend to ask: why is the west letting us down? In the West, 
Russia is considered a hostile neighbour, intending to recreate the soviet empire 
and to undermine Western democracy. 
Rather than trying to figure out the “rights and wrongs” of the situation, this short 
paper will try to assess the consequences of the growing split between EU and 
Russia.  
Effect of the deadlock on economic relations 
In the first place, the damage done to present trade relations is only part of the sto-
ry. Between 2013 and 2017, the trade between Russia and the EU fell by about 
30% or about 8% per year, significantly more than the fall in Russia’s trade with 
                                                          
1 Full implementation of the Minsk agreements; closer ties with Russia's former Soviet 
neighbours; strengthening EU resilience to Russian threats; selective engagement with 
Russia on certain issues such as counter-terrorism; and support for people-to-people 
contacts. 
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the rest of the world. Russia is still EU’s fourth trade partner (from being 3rd three 
years ago). The pattern of trade is still the same and similar to the trade between 
EU and developing countries: imports from Russia of raw materials (about 80%) 
and exports of manufactured goods. It is generally recognised by the Russian 
leaders that the economy is in urgent need of modernisation and diversification. 
Homegrown initiatives have only been moderately successful and Russia has to 
rely on foreign investment to modernise and diversify. EU has been the dominant 
source of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Russia, representing about ¾ of the 
stock of FDI. It is therefore worrying that the fall in FDI flows is even more im-
portant than the fall in trade: between 2013 and 2017 the stock fell with 6 %, the 
(more volatile) flow with 60%. This implies that the two economies are growing 
apart after more than two decades of rapprochement: the value chains become less 
integrated, jeopardizing future post-conflict re-launching of economic relations. 
Consequences in Russia 
This is illustrated in the first place by the fact that Russia’s priority has shifted 
from its relations with the West to its relations with its former Soviet partners. 
The start in 2015 of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) is an important land-
mark in this process. Despite its teething problems, its conflicts between member 
states and Russia’s dominance of the organisation the EAEU exists, its secretariat 
functions and economic relations between the member states develop and trade 
agreements are signed with third countries. However, at this stage the share of in-
tra EAEU trade remains rather low. For Russia in 2016 it is close to 9% (as com-
pared with 40% with the EU in 2017 – down from 50% five years ago). However, 
in view of modernisation and diversification of its economy, Russia can find more 
effective partners in the EU than in the other EAEU Member states. 
Secondly, the shift away from the West is illustrated by the “Asia pivot”, and in 
particular the rapprochement between Russia and China, announced by President 
Putin in 2014, and driven by the European sanctions. The diversification of rela-
tions towards Asian countries was already initiated earlier and is important from 
an economic as well as geopolitical point of view. In a wider context, it is part of 
the movement of emerging countries to consolidate their position in the world 
economy, claim their role in the economic and political world governance.   
After a slow start, economic cooperation between Russia and China (but also In-
dia and South Korea) is developing rapidly. Trade with China has tripled and 
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reached about $ 80 billion in 2017. It is expected that, if present trends continue, 
China will replace EU as Russia most important trade partner by the end of the 
decade. Supported by the Russia-China Investment Fund, investment has devel-
oped these last years and economic cooperation in various fields (hi-tech as well 
as energy) has been initiated. As Putin recently stated: “More than 70 priority pro-
jects worth over $ 20 billion are being implemented through the intergovernmen-
tal commission for investment cooperation”. 
A wider geopolitical context 
These investments are part of the wider context of China's ambitious One Belt 
One Road (OBOR) initiative, a trillion-dollar plan that spans about 65 countries 
and 4.4 billion people. Under the OBOR plan, China will pour money into rail-
roads, highways and other projects in former Soviet states such as Kazakhstan and 
Uzbekistan. The aim of OBOR is not only to (re)create transport links between 
China and Europe, but, along the transport corridors (Silk Road(s)), to promote 
industrial investments in function of the development of the “value chain” of Chi-
na’s economy.  
The Asia pivot is at least in part successful, but the question remains how the rela-
tionship between Russia and China develops and whether Russia will not be rele-
gated economically and politically to play second fiddle. Again, EU is a more re-
liable partner for the modernisation and diversification of its economy and it 
would be too risky for Russia to put all its eggs in the Asian basket. From a politi-
cal as well as economic point of view, a balanced approach relying on EU as well 
as Asian partners seems to be indicated. 
To sum up: on the Russian side: although a new dynamic is developing, including 
Central Asian countries, but mainly centred on China, Russia is losing out on the 
potential development of the relations with the EU, still its main trade partner and 
main source of modern industrial investment. 
Implications for the EU 
But what are the risks the EU is taking by keeping its relations with Russia in the 
freezer? 
The possible future synergies activated through the combination of the develop-
ment of the EAEU, of the Russia China economic cooperation and the of the One-
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Belt-One-Road initiative is creating a new centre of economic dynamism, sup-
ported by political frameworks of emerging countries such as BRICS1, security 
organisations such as Shanghai Cooperation organisation (SCO) and Collective 
Security Treaty Organisation) CSTO. This could well result in a marginalisation 
of the EU in the economic and political development of the Eurasian continent. 
EU considers these various initiatives with great scepticism: the EAEU is not ef-
fective and ridded with bilateral quarrels between Member States; China and Rus-
sia are competitors, suspicious of each other and disputing the leadership of the 
collaboration; partner countries of the OBOR initiative will grow wary about Chi-
nese imperial behaviour etc. There may be an element of truth in each of these 
allegations, but it would be presumptuous to assume that all these initiatives will 
fail or that the EU is capable of turning them around and position itself as a full 
partner, concluding with the countries concerned its standard agreements (Associ-
ation Agreement, DCFTA2…), pretending to be the hub of Eurasian economic co-
operation. 
To sum up: the EU risks being excluded from a potentially import new growth 
initiative. EU’s position is further weakened by its internal problems, the loss of 
its position as an economic model and normative point of reference. The widening 
gap with the traditional transatlantic partner and ally does not make the EU posi-
tion more comfortable  
A way out of the deadlock? 
It has been argued that the present deadlock of the EU-Russia relations risks to 
result in a situation where both EU and Russia find themselves on the losing end, 
with China benefiting from the processes it is skilfully steering, with EU being 
side lined and Russia playing a secondary role. 
If the EU-Russia deadlock is detrimental for both sides, a way must be found to 
get out of it. Unfortunately, dialogue has turned into a series of parallel mono-
logues, restating well-known positions. Rather than play the blame game, it is 
more productive to look forward to what can be done together without losing face. 
In the short run, two approaches could be tried: the first one that could be the start 
                                                          
1 Association of five emerging countries: Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. 
2 DCFTA: Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area. 
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of a disentanglement of the Ukraine conflict, the second one that could better po-
sition the EU to participate in the new economic developments in the Eurasian 
continent.  
x The first issue at stake is the “Minsk Agreement” that has been approved 
by both sides. However, on none of the items listed in the protocol has 
substantive progress been realised: the ceasefire remains very fragile, bro-
ken on a daily basis by repeated incidents, withdrawal of heavy weapons, 
exchange of prisoners and amnesty have only partially been implemented. 
The law on decentralisation approved by the Ukrainian Parliament in Jan-
uary of this year is not acceptable to the “temporarily occupied territories”. 
The situation is complex with difficult to control local actors. A first step 
in the right direction, inspired by humanitarian as well as political consid-
erations could be the reaching an agreement on a UN peacekeeping force 
with an agreed mandate, adequate number and agreed origin of peacekeep-
ers, rules of engagement, geographical scope etc. President Putin as well 
as President Poroshenko and the US administration have hinted that they 
are open to the idea, but as always the “devil is in the detail”. 
x Since the Eurasian Union exists, Russia insists on the EAEU as counter-
part of the EU in trade negotiations. Although some cooperation takes 
place at the technical level, on customs procedures, trade regulations, 
standards and norms, the EU does not recognize the EAEU as a counter-
part at political level. As will be analysed and argued in Peter Van El-
suwege’s paper intensification of existing contacts (including opening of 
more political contacts) can take place in a gradual manner without losing 
face on the EU side. Moreover, by enlarging the geographical scope of 
countries concerned: EU, EAEU and “other countries” it would be possi-
ble to realise constructive trade facilitating agreements, allowing the EU to 
become a partner in the Russia/China/EAEU/OBOR dynamics. 
Finally, some modus vivendi should be reached to avoid further provocative action 
and to tone down the messages passed on the airwaves in in the social media. Pub-
lic diplomacy – and cultural diplomacy in particular ௅ can help to change the per-
ception of the other side from a first-class enemy to a trusted partner. 
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EU ௅ RUSSIA: MAKING UP FOR SECURITY  
COOPERATION SHORTFALL 
 
The former axiomatic EU – Russia formula “we are doomed to cooperation”, 
which was based on a solid array of trade and economic cooperation, significant 
mutual interests and proximity of positions on many international security and cri-
sis management issues, did not stand the test of the Ukrainian crisis in 2014. The 
“common spaces” concept “from Lisbon to Vladivostok” failed, as well as the 
“almost completed” new basic EU - Russia agreement. The EU faced serious ob-
stacles to its “soft” expansion, which hit the Russian space of “special interests”. 
For the European Union Russia has turned from a strategic partner into a strategic 
challenge and a threat to European security order. The systematic political dia-
logue and sectoral cooperation have been dismantled and replaced by relationship 
of sanctions. 
 
Revised F&S Concepts: lack of strategic vision 
 
Since the EU – Russia wind-up summit in January 2014, which was held in a re-
duced format, relations between the parties still remain uncertain. There is no stra-
tegic vision of relationship; pragmatic cooperation is repressed by geopolitical 
paradigm of mutual deterrence and sanctions. Adaptive responses to the changed 
political realities and international dynamics prevail over strategic thinking and 
perspective. 
 
The EU's Global Strategy (EUGS) reflects perception of Russia as a “revisionist 
power”, but does not represent a strategy towards Russia. Mogherini’s “five guid-
ing principles”1 are rather an attempt to find an internal balance within the Euro-
                                                          
1 Outcome of the Council Meeting. 3457th Council meeting. Foreign Affairs. Brussels, 
14 March 2016. – P.  4. 
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pean Union, than a conceptual framework for relations with Russia. Brussels re-
duces opportunities of rethinking relations with Russia to the Minsk agreements 
eventuality, which implementation is seen as Russia's primarily responsibility in 
the settlement of the Ukrainian conflict. Yet, Moscow does not consider itself a 
party to the conflict and therefore cannot agree with either the European approach 
to its settlement or the EU's conditionality towards Russia. 
 
The Russia’s Foreign Policy Concept approved by President Vladimir Putin on 30 
November 2016, considers the “systemic problems in the Euro-Atlantic region” 
and a serious crisis in Russian-Western relations through a prism of  geopolitical 
expansion pursued by NATO and EU, and “their refusal to begin implementation 
of political statements regarding the creation of a common European security and 
cooperation framework”. But Moscow, despite the radical revision of the EU's 
line towards Russia, answers it asymmetrically, keeps calling the EU “an im-
portant trade and economic and foreign policy partner”1. However, in Russia there 
is no clear vision of how to build relations with the “important partner” ௅ the Eu-
ropean Union, whose members have united around a common platform of deter-
ring Russia to counter its “aggressive actions” and “a growingly assertive military 
posture”2. 
 
The European response to Russia's attempts to gradually stabilise relations was 
recognition that without Moscow it is impossible to solve the most important in-
ternational problems, among them crisis management, and thus channels for dia-
logue (diplomacy) are needed, even if to just discuss disagreements. Yet, in this 
case, Moscow is no longer treated as a difficult partner, but rather as an inevitable 
neighbour (from whom it is impossible to escape to another planet), and this clear-
ly reduces the profile of “meaningful dialogue” and cooperation potential. But at 
                                                          
1 Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (approved by President of the Russian 
Federation Vladimir Putin on November 30, 2016) // The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
the Russian Federation, 1 December 2016. available at: 
http://www.mid.ru/en/web/guest/foreign_policy/official_documents/-
/asset_publisher/CptICkB6BZ29/content/id/2542248  
2 Facing Russia’s strategic challenge: Security developments from the Baltic to the Black 
Sea // Directorate-General for External Policies. Policy Department. - November 2017 - 
PE 603.853. – P. 4. available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2017/603853/EXPO_STU(2017)
603853_EN.pdf  
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least it doesn't close the perspective and, on the contrary, leaves windows of op-
portunities re-opened. As the EUGS postulates, “the EU and Russia are interde-
pendent. We will therefore engage Russia to discuss disagreements and cooperate 
if and when our interests overlap”1. 
 
Such windows of opportunities, along with the objective interest of the EU and 
the most of its Member States to normalise and stabilise mutual cooperation, al-
low to consider a positive perspective of relations, in spite of tough disputes. In 
fact, the strategic choice comes down to two optional scenarios – escalation of 
confrontation or restoration of comprehensive cooperation. And this is a matter 
not of the “attribution” of responsible for the current crisis, but rather of ensuring 
that national and collective strategies are focused on the preservation and enhanc-
ing a Common Europe as an indispensable and fundamental joint goal. There has 
happened a significant distortion towards mutual deterrence in Europe, and the 
conflicting parties keep on investing significant political and material resources in 
“anger management”. However maintaining stability and risk reduction should be 
not only included in the current confrontational agenda, but serve to restore com-
mon European partnership. In other words, even if Russia and the EU have no 
longer an opportunity to return to “the common spaces”, it is necessary to declare 
and follow the strategic vision of a common Europe as a constant unifying objec-
tive. In practical terms, this should contribute to the restoration of a systemic po-
litical and security dialogue at all international fora, platforms and levels, notably 
EU – Russia, NATO – Russia Council (NRC), OSCE, crisis management multi-
lateral negotiations formats. 
 
Towards F&S political dialogue: Russia’s standpoint 
 
Restoring of a systemic dialogue between Russia and the West should become a 
matter of high priority. Both sides agree that in modern conditions the return to 
“business as usual” is impossible. However, even mutual deterrence and challeng-
es require special attention to arrange strategic communications. The fragmented 
political dialogue may turn into multiplication of mutual risks and threats, military 
and political ones inter alia, and thus strengthen confrontational trends. The Eu-
ropean Union has frozen the structured political dialogue with Russia under the 
                                                          
1 Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the Europe-
an Union’s Foreign and Security Policy. – June 2016. – P. 33. available at 
http://eeas.europa.eu/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf 
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Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA). NATO௅Russia Council’s activi-
ties have been decreased to a minimized level of political contacts; the OSCE de-
grades as a cooperative all-European security platform (as well as the Council of 
Europe) and becomes a hostage of Russian-Western contradictions and disagree-
ments, turning into arena of political struggle. 
 
At the same time, despite the declared Euro-Atlantic solidarity, there is rather no 
conceptual political unity with regard to future relations with Russia. Having pro-
posed a “principled” selective engagement, the European Council blocked the 
structured political dialogue with Moscow. However, the same Member States, on 
the contrary, support within NATO a double-track approach to Russia, i.e. deter-
rence + political dialogue, but refuse any practical cooperation through NRC.  
This, in turn, reinforces strategic imbalances in national foreign policies’, espe-
cially in security dimension. Also incoherent national security and defence poli-
cies hamper the EU/NATO Member States to develop bi-lateral relations with 
Russia. The increased challenges in ensuring transatlantic balances, manifested 
differences between the US administration and European allies, as well as within 
both the EU and NATO complicate a search of common lines in relations with 
Russia. In this regard, Moscow, on the one hand, and the Euro-Atlantic communi-
ty, on the other, face the Russia-West deficit of strategic communications and se-
curity dialogue.  
 
From the Russian viewpoint, it seems vital to correct the institutional Euro-
Atlantic asymmetry: to unblock practical cooperation in the NRC and thereby 
give a real content to NATO-Russia political dialogue; on the EU–Russia level to 
agree on prospective agenda of cooperation (even in the selective engagement 
format) by restoring systematic political dialogue. However, until now, this con-
cept of a balanced Euro-Atlantic policy towards Russia is not perceived in the 
West as the core line of practical approach. The EU and NATO have been jointly 
searching consolidated answers to a “Russian challenge” and forging enhanced 
partnership mechanisms, where in fact the Russian agenda is considered within 
the paradigm of deterrence. 
 
Nevertheless, for Moscow in its relations with the EU it is important not to miss a 
common European perspective and to focus the dialogue in this direction, not-
withstanding current political obstacles. At a time when mutual deterrence trajec-
tory limits possibilities of bilateral relations, Russia appeals to “harmonising and 
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aligning interests of European and Eurasian integration processes, which is ex-
pected to prevent the emergence of dividing lines on the European continent”1. 
This creates both prospects and challenges. 
 
The positive prospects rest in shaping strategic vision of the Common Eurasian 
space, where practical cooperation should be enhanced. The EU and Russia could 
harmonise their multi-faced interests in Asia to strengthen their relations with the 
regional powers, and, most importantly, with China, within the EU – Russia coop-
eration conceptual framework. The EU Strategy for Central Asia, which is under 
development, seems to increases its motivations to reconcile activities with Rus-
sia, and Brussels inserted Central Asia in its “five guiding principles” of relations 
and selective engagement with Russia. 
 
The difficulties relate to the complexity of reconciling the interests of Russia and 
the EU on the post-Soviet space, and especially in Central Asia, where the EU's 
position is uncertain and relatively weak. Moscow is hardly inclined to view Cen-
tral Asia as a space of agreements with the European Union in the context of “se-
lective” relations. On the other hand, the EAEU is in the process of taking shape, 
and this limits its potential interaction with the EU. In addition, the eventual co-
operation of the two unions in any case would be overshadowed by the Russian-
European differences at the contesting neighbourhood. Also the lack of S&D di-
mension in the EAEU, by definition, does not allow Russia and the EU to channel 
their security relations into this institutional framework. 
 
Of course, the clashes of interests and strategic competition will continue to press 
over Russia-EU relations in the post-Soviet space. However, the parties should 
emphasize both the common Europe goals they are committed to, and the oppor-
tunities of potential cooperation between two integration organisations – the EU 
and the EAEU. Anyway, the Russia – EU dialogue on cooperation in the post-
Soviet space and in the Central Asia cannot be held as “selective”, it can take 
place only in the general context of Russian-European relations. 
 
                                                          
1 Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (approved by President of the Russian 
Federation Vladimir Putin on November 30, 2016) // The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
the Russian Federation, 1 December 2016. available at: 
http://www.mid.ru/en/web/guest/foreign_policy/official_documents/-
/asset_publisher/CptICkB6BZ29/content/id/2542248 
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Similarly, both parties will inevitably consider the EU – Russia dialogue and in-
terplay in the CIS, including on so-called frozen conflicts, through the paradigm 
of mutual deterrence and conflict of interests in the post-Soviet space. This, in 
turn, complicates progress in the settlement of conflicts within the joint negotia-
tion formats, where Russia and the EU participate (5+2, the OSCE Minsk group, 
the Normandy format, etc.). 
 
The changing EU's face and CFDP ambitions 
 
Not only Russia is seen differently in the EU after 2014, but also the EU in Rus-
sia. Moscow ceased to perceive the European Union as a dominant of its “Europe-
an choice”, declared by Putin at the turn of the 2000s. Even before the Ukrainian 
crisis, Moscow, when negotiating with the EU, emphasized that Russia is an inte-
gral part of Europe, and the European Union should not monopolize European 
perspective, in particular, when it appeals to common democratic values. The 
normative expansion of the European Union faced Russian wall – Moscow insist-
ed on the mutual legal and administrative harmonisation in the framework of the 
common spaces. The Eastern partnership policy was interpreted as the EU's intru-
sion into the post-Soviet space, without taking into consideration the interests of 
Russia and common European perspective. 
 
In 2014, the European Union's refusal to continue systematic cooperation with 
Moscow provoked a significant drought of bilateral dialogue on the global agenda 
and European security. The parties are not inclined to dramatize the situation and 
emphasize that their dialogue continues. Along with the meetings on the sidelines 
of international events, Federica Mogherini visited Moscow in April 2017. But 
still this did not become a “first step” to restore bilateral political communica-
tions. The lack of systemic political dialogue significantly reduces opportunities 
for cooperation in the security sphere. On the part of Moscow, this is perceived as 
a substantial obstacle to bilateral relations, but also as a problem of the European 
Union's partnership capacity. Objectively, the EU cannot pretend to be a global 
player without establishing a framework of strategic relations with the key centers 
of power, in particular with Russia. In other words, Brussels should find opportu-
nities to normalize communication and political dialogue with Moscow, if the EU 
is really committed to increase its influence and contribute to coping with global 
and European security challenges and threats. 
 
EU – Russia: Making up for Security Cooperation Shortfall 26
The EU’s Global Strategy regards the US as a “core partner” on a broad security 
agenda, “the EU will deepen cooperation with the US and Canada on crisis man-
agement, counter-terrorism, cyber, migration, energy and climate action”1. The 
EU ௅ NATO Partnership Declarations, which were signed in 2016 and 2018 at 
Warsaw and Brussels NATO summits, make the CSDP focused on conceptual set, 
objectives and decisions taken by NATO. The EU activity tends to firmly line up 
with NATO strategic guidelines and operational activities, which are aimed at 
containment of Russia and comprehensive response to Russian-made threats and 
challenges, including hybrid war and cyber threats, by possible resorting inter alia 
to the Article 5 of the Washington Treaty on collective defence. The EU’s Plan of 
Military Mobility (in the North Sea ௅ Baltic corridor), approved in March 2018, is 
an evidence of  consolidation of the EU’s operational activities and capabilities 
within the Atlantic strategy of Russia’s containment. 
 
For Russia, this signals a change in the EU's security posture, when the Union’s 
strategic ambitions and advancing European defence, including PESCO, could 
consolidate a long-term line in the EU on deterrence of Russia and, therefore, fur-
ther complicate security cooperation and political reconciliation. On the other 
hand, such an Atlantic drift of the EU does not strengthen prospects of European 
political autonomy but, on the contrary, binds it with the US’s strategy and securi-
ty doctrine, not to mention a destructive impact of Trump's political maneuvering 
and his “America first” message to the allies. Moreover, the Russian card contin-
ues to be played out in the transatlantic game (collective deterrence and burden 
sharing, sanctions, Nord Stream-2, Helsinki Trump-Putin summit...). Therefore, 
the EU’s claims to strategic autonomy in fact are coupled with weakening of the 
CSDP independent capacity, a change in its profile towards the consolidated 
Western deterrence of Russia and, consequently, an even greater dependence on 
the US strategic guidelines and F&SP decision-making. 
 
“Windows of opportunities” for the EU-Russia cooperation, not only in the field 
of international security, cannot be open without normalization of Russian-
American relations, and its prospects are rather faint. Even where the EU's posi-
tion is objectively close to Russia, but does not coincide with an American stand, 
                                                          
1 Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the Europe-
an Union’s Foreign and Security Policy. – June 2016. – P.37. available at: 
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as, for example, on the Iranian dossier (JCPOA), Europeans are limited both in 
stabilizing influence on US administration and in combining efforts with Moscow. 
 
European influence on the key pillars of the Russia-West strategic balance has 
critically decreased in the context of Trump's anti-multilateralism, whereas the 
next Washington’s unilateral actions, for example, a possible rejection of the INF 
Treaty, would be a new blow to European security, European defence and politi-
cal autonomy, as well as for the Russian-European relations. With this in mind, 
Russia and the EU need making efforts to step up cooperation on international and 
European security agenda of mutual importance, including Ukraine, Syria and 
Iran, on countering common strategic challenges and threats, especially interna-
tional terrorism and illegal migration, arms control and non-proliferation. There 
are serious hurdles on the way of gradually restoration of institutional platforms 
for dialogue and cooperation, in particular, Russia – EU systematic political dia-
logue as well as the result-oriented work of the NATO – Russia Council. 
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SECURITY THREATS IN EUROPE: POSSIBILITIES  
AND OBSTACLES FOR EU௅RUSSIA COOPERATION 
 
Introduction 
We meet at a time of great international tension between East and West, an evolu-
tion, which is very unfortunate. At the core lies a mutual distrust, which devel-
oped after the end of Cold War, and especially during the second half of the 
1990s. We need mutual empathy to try to escape from the current situation. The 
West has, in my opinion, made some major geopolitical mistakes in its relation-
ship towards Moscow. NATO enlargement, pushed by Washington, was certainly 
one of them. The American president Bush sr. and then Soviet leader Mikhail 
Gorbachev had agreed in 1990 to reunify Germany and make it a NATO member, 
but NATO would not expand one inch further. NATO broke that agreement and 
expanded anyway in several waves. Historical fears in Central Europe fed into 
this process. Washington also promoted an agenda of regime change in the former 
Soviet sphere of influence in the 2000s.  
Developments such as these made a common security analysis by East and West 
very difficult. In my personal opinion, NATO does not constitute part of the solu-
tion, rather it is a part of the problem in the relations between East and West.  
At the same time, we are being confronted by important new changes in the geo-
political landscape. The election of American president Donald Trump and Brexit 
are changing the geopolitical and geostrategic theatre. As a result, several EU 
countries have realized that they should themselves take more responsibility in the 
realm of defence. Steps are being taken to develop the European Union as a secu-
rity actor. Important in this regard is that the EU conceptually uses what I would 
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call a “broad definition” of security, not only focused on the military dimension, 
but also on the economic, environmental and societal dimensions.  
These geopolitical changes are also an opportunity to undo some of the mistakes 
in the past that have led to the unfortunate tensions between East and West. Eu-
rope will have to evolve towards a more independent geopolitical pole, which 
means a realization that our interests do not always match completely with those 
of Washington. They may also not always match with those of Moscow, but it is 
important to explore where a win-win might be possible and the current atmos-
phere of distrust can be overcome.  
In my opinion, the prism of the “broad definition” of security gives us a conceptu-
al tool today to start discussing with one another the challenges, which we are 
both confronted with, so as to explore whether we can develop common strate-
gies. In essence, the question lying before us is whether cooperation between the 
EU countries and Russia on some of these domains is possible.  
As already concluded by some European geopolitical scholars in the past (and 
here I take the liberty to also mention the work at the Geneva Institute of Geopo-
litical Studies in Switzerland, of which I am a member since the first hour),  the 
geopolitical interests of Europe and Russia are much more complementary than 
one would think. On the Eurasian continent, both entities play major roles as secu-
rity providers in each of the above-mentioned dimensions.  
What interests binds us together and how can we devise strategies to work to-
gether?  
Remember the 1970s 
The past can also offer us some inspiration. At the end of the 1960s, a similar 
East-West tension existed. Belgium took the initiative under our then Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Pierre Harmel for diplomatic talks with several Eastern European 
countries. Although the initiative initially seemed to have failed, it gave impetus 
to the later so-called “Helsinki Accords” in 1975.  
The Accords' “Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participat-
ing States” enumerated 10 points: 
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1. Sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty 
2. Refraining from the threat or use of force 
3. Inviolability of frontiers 
4. Territorial integrity of States 
5. Peaceful settlement of disputes 
6. Non-intervention in internal affairs 
7. Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the free-
dom of thought, conscience, religion or belief 
8. Equal rights and self-determination of peoples 
9. Co-operation among States 
10. Fulfillment in good faith of obligations under international law 
The document was seen by East and West as a significant step toward reducing 
Cold War tensions. Both parties in essence respected each other’s geopolitical 
sphere of influence. Looking back, one can understand why Moscow sees the en-
largement of NATO as a form of undermining that gained stability, perhaps even 
provoking a counter-response. Whereas in Western media the policy actions of 
Moscow are often portrayed as “offensive”, perhaps they were just “defensive” 
(see: ‘Defensive Realism’).  
The result is that we again seem to be locked in a world of competition and a zero 
sum game, whereas a positive sum game would lie more in our reach than we 
would think. What common challenges are we confronted with?     
Common challenges, which we are confronted with 
Taking a “broad definition of security” several domains come within the radar of 
possible cooperation:  
x Energy security  
Europe and Russia clearly are objective partners in the domain of energy. The EU 
is rapidly transitioning towards natural gas in combination with renewable energy. 
The age of oil will remain, but decline in relative terms. Europe will remain an 
important customer of Russian gas, even while Moscow rightly so diversifies its 
portfolio in the direction of Asia. New natural gas fields in the territorial waters of 
Cyprus, and perhaps even Greece or Syria are also of interest to the Russian fed-
eration. The question is whether a win-win could be found in this regard.  
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If Europe transitions in a few decades away from oil, new alternatives will have to 
be found for e.g. plastics. The petrochemical industry will have to be replaced by 
a bio-based chemical industry, based upon sustainability criteria. The Russian 
federation could become a major exporter to Europe in the field of biomass. In 
return, the EU and Russia could already today start working together in setting up 
expertise and perhaps even joint intellectual property in a future bio-based chemi-
cal industry.  
x Economic security  
It is in the interest of both East and West to maintain steady economic relations. 
But there is a hurdle to take; both East and West should be able to buy themselves 
into the companies of the other side via foreign direct investments under a com-
mon legal framework or rules. Perhaps certain sectors could be identified that 
could spearhead such a process. For a long time this has constituted a hurdle to 
achieve true complementarity in the economic realm.   
x Environmental security 
All our countries will in the coming decades be affected by climate change. We 
will need common solutions and new technologies to mitigate the upcoming un-
foreseen problems, with which all our societies will be confronted. Russia’s prob-
lems are Europe’s problems and the other way around in this regard. Europe can 
help with energy efficiency technologies in Russian housing and industry while 
Russia can help in the energy domain.  
If natural gas is the ‘bridge fuel’ towards a renewable energy future, we urgently 
need to work together on a problem mentioned in the World Energy Outlook 2017 
by the International Energy Agency; the leaking of the climate-dangerous me-
thane in natural gas production.  
Another problem to be tackled together, which receives too little attention, is the 
rapid degradation in biodiversity. The Russian federation and Europe could work 
together in this regard.  
x Confidence building measures and cultural diplomacy 
Within societal security there are many historical links between Russia and Eu-
rope. Think for instance of the rich cultural heritage in Saint Petersburg and Mos-
cow. Via an active cultural diplomacy, it would be possible to make sure that our 
population gets to know the other partner better. In Saint Petersburg there is, for 
Security Threats in Europe: Possibilities and Obstacles for EU-Russia Cooperation 32
instance, an active Dutch institute that can play a role in this regard. Cultural di-
plomacy can help in getting to know each other better, and in nurturing a positive 
atmosphere.   
x Radicalisation of individuals, terrorism and intelligence sharing  
Within the harder part of societal security, both our societies are being confronted 
with radicalization and terrorism. Belgium has woken up to this new reality after 
the terrorist attacks of 22 March 2016. A new security culture is being implement-
ed by its authorities. A more structural exchange of intelligence sharing could cre-
ate a mutually beneficial cooperation.  
Last but not least, there are two elephants in the room with regard to security, 
which should be mentioned – Ukraine and Syria.  
In the Ukrainian case, the European Union did not realize in 2013 that its nego-
tiations for an Association Agreement with Ukraine had major geo-economic and 
geostrategic consequences for the Russian federation. The EU has great difficulty 
in understanding Geopolitics, still locked in a technical world of neoliberalism. 
What happened afterwards is a geopolitical disaster for both East and West. In-
stead of comparing notes on our perception of the situation on the ground since 
2013, let us think about how the situation could be stabilized again. The Cold War 
gives us in the geostrategic domain the example of Austria. This country promised 
to remain neutral and thus could flourish. It is my firm belief that Ukraine, which 
literally means border zone, should remain just that and return to its non-aligned 
status. This would mean that NATO should indefinitely freeze any direct or indi-
rect cooperation with the government of the Ukraine, take a step back and allow 
the European Union to become the main interlocutor in the realm of security in a 
broad definition.  Ukraine must return to a policy of neutrality in “hard security 
topics”. This would allow the country to cooperate economically more freely with 
both East and West.  In a later phase, one could think of more autonomy for the 
Russian speaking regions in the East of the country. President Putin suggested 
some scenarios in this regard in the past. Only if the security issue is solved, 
Ukraine can become a geo-economic place where East and West meet and coop-
erate.  
In the Syrian case, the West has also made some major mistakes. But both Rus-
sia and the West have worked together in defeating ISIS / Daesh. It would be 
dramatic if tensions between both sides rise any further. The European public 
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opinion does not want this. In fact, it is now more than clear that the government 
of al-Assad has won the war west of the Euphrates River. Many European leaders 
may have difficulty admitting this to their public, but this is the truth. East of the 
Euphrates River the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) have consolidated the terri-
tory.  
Taking this important intellectual step in the West – that al-Assad has won west of 
the Euphrates and the SDF east of the Euphrates – there is a window of opportuni-
ty to work together. In the coming weeks and months, the war will continue in the 
province of Idlib with conventional means. Can a joint plan be devised so as to 
safeguard the local population?  
Moreover, there is a risk that the Syrian war will soon develop another dimension. 
Israel accuses Iran of establishing a power base in Syria. We can debate whether 
this is true or not, but that in itself does not help. If Israel or Saudi Arabia would 
take matters into their own hands, there is an acute danger the Syrian war will 
overflow the region in ways that can no longer be contained.  
It is my belief such a dramatic scenario would be against the geopolitical interests 
of both Europe and Russia. In other words, there is currently a window of oppor-
tunity to try to put the genie of war back in the Syrian box before its new chapter 
explodes in our faces.  
To conclude, I do believe there are currently opportunities in all dimensions of 
security. In the new geopolitical landscape, which is gradually forming, it is in the 
interest of both Europe and Russia to try to understand each other, overcome our 
differences, and attempt to work together.  
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OVERCOMING LEGAL INCOMPATIBILITIES  
AND POLITICAL DISTRUST: THE CHALLENGING  
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN UNION  
AND THE EURASIAN ECONOMIC UNION 
 
The absence of formal relations between the European Union (EU) and the Eura-
sian Economic Union (EAEU) may be understood against the background of 
competing paradigms for the shared neighbourhood between the EU and Russia1. 
On the one hand, the Eastern Partnership (EaP) essentially aims at the export of 
the EU’s norms and values to its eastern neighbours. This is done on the basis of a 
conditionality-based approach and essentially at a bilateral level. The EU’s mantra 
in this respect is the ‘more for more’ approach. The more a neighbouring country 
adheres to the EU’s norms and values, the more benefits it can get ranging from a 
visa-free regime to close economic relations in the form of a Deep and Compre-
hensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) and political association (be it without a clear 
membership perspective). On the other hand, the process of Eurasian integration 
proceeds from a completely different logic in the sense that it promotes the objec-
tive of regional (trade) integration in the post-Soviet space within the framework 
of the EAEU. The long-term objective is what Russian President Putin used to call 
a ‘common economic space from Lisbon to Vladivostok’ on the basis of a grand 
agreement between the EU and the EAEU.  
For a number of reasons, such a formal arrangement between the EU and the 
EAEU is not a very realistic scenario. First, as long as not all EAEU member 
                                                          
1 See also: P. Van Elsuwege, “The European Union and the Eurasian Economic Union: 
Searching for the Lowest Common Denominator”, in: O. Potemkina (ed.), The EU 
Global Strategy: Implications for Russia, RAS: Moscow, 2017, pp. 63௅81.  
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states are also party to the WTO any discussion about a potential EU-EAEU trade 
deal is premature. Second, the EU’s external action is to a large extent driven by 
an aspiration to export its values abroad. From this perspective, offering a free 
trade deal to the EAEU is difficult to reconcile with the EU’s traditional condi-
tionality approach. Third, and partly as a result of the previous reasons, the EU is 
very reluctant to formally engage with the EAEU as a regional organisation. From 
an EU perspective, there is a clear pitfall that a formalization of the EU-EAEU 
dialogue creates a ‘bloc’ to ‘bloc’ dynamic, which is potentially detrimental for 
the EU’s bilateral relations with the countries in the region.  
Already in September 2013, European Commissioner for enlargement and neigh-
bourhood policy Stefan Füle declared that “the development of the Eurasian Eco-
nomic Union project must respect our partner’s sovereign decisions”1. This 
statement must be seen against the background of the pressure exercised by Rus-
sia on the EaP countries in anticipation of the November 2013 Vilnius summit and 
has been repeated consistently afterwards. It may thus well be argued that the 
right of every country to freely choose the level of ambition and the goals, to 
which it aspires in its relations with the EU is of fundamental significance in the 
context of EU-Russia and, by extension, EU-EAEU relations. In this respect, it is 
also noteworthy that one of the “five guiding principles” for the EU’s policy to-
wards Russia, adopted in March 2016, concerns the strengthening of bilateral rela-
tions with the former Soviet Republics in the EU’s eastern neighbourhood and 
Central Asia2.  
Hence, the fear that a formal recognition of the EAEU would undermine the EU’s 
bilateral approach to countries in the post-Soviet space is the main reason explain-
ing the Union’s reluctance of engaging with the EAEU as an actor in its own 
right. On the other hand, of course, the reality cannot be ignored and this reality is 
that the EAEU exists as an international organisation with a separate legal person-
ality and with significant competences, particularly in the area of trade policy. As 
                                                          
1 S. Füle, Statement on the pressure exercised by Russia on countries of the Eastern Part-
nership, Speech 13/687, 11 September 2013, available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_SPEECH-13-687_en.htm  
2 See: Remarks by HR/VP Federica Mogherini at the press conference following the For-
eign Affairs Council, 14 March 2016, available at: 
https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/5490_en  
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a result, some kind of technical cooperation on customs and product standards 
seems unavoidable and recommendable. This was also the conclusion of an ‘Is-
sues Paper on Relations with Russia’, drafted by the EU’s External Action Service 
(EEAS) in January 2015, which suggested “some level of engagement with the 
EAEU” but warned, at the same time, that this should not affect “the non-
negotiable principle of free choice for all partners in the common neighbour-
hood”1. This quite accurately summarises the EU’s policy dilemma with respect to 
the EAEU: how to deal with this new reality without affecting its own neighbour-
hood strategy?  
The search for this balance between accepting the EAEU as a new reality and a 
matter of fact without undermining the scope for the development of differentiat-
ed bilateral relations with the countries of the post-Soviet space determines the 
EU’s strategy to the region. In this respect, the conclusion of new bilateral agree-
ments with the EAEU countries Kazakhstan and Armenia is of particular signifi-
cance in the sense that it illustrates that EAEU membership is reconcilable with 
close bilateral links with the EU. With Kazakhstan, the enhanced Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement (EPCA) significantly upgrades the bilateral relationship 
in comparison to the old PCA that entered into force in 19992. Of particular sig-
nificance are the extensive rules on trade and trade-related matters dealing with 
issues such as customs cooperation, technical barriers to trade; Sanitary and Phy-
tosanitary Standards (SPS), the protection of intellectual property rights and gov-
ernment procurement. Those areas are also covered within the EAEU. In order to 
avoid any collision between Kazakhstan’s obligations under the EAEU and its 
commitments under the EPCA, the standards applicable within the WTO are used 
as a common denominator.  
Similar references to WTO law can also be found in the more recently concluded 
Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA) between the EU 
                                                          
1 Issues Paper on Relations with Russia, Foreign Affairs Council of 19 January 2015, 
available at: blogs.ft.com/brusselsblog/files/2015/01/Russia.pdf 
2 The text of the agreement is available at: 
https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/kazakhstan/18499/enhanced-partnership-and-
cooperation-agreement-between-european-union-and-republic-kazakhstan_en  
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and Armenia1. Moreover, this agreement includes remarkably detailed provisions 
related to the gradual regulatory approximation of Armenia’s domestic legislation 
with key elements of the EU acquis in areas such as energy, environment and 
consumer protection. Without entering into the details of the agreement and its 
annexes, it suffices to recall that the CEPA may be regarded as an alternative to 
the planned Association Agreement between the EU and Armenia. The latter was 
never initialled due to the decision of Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan in Sep-
tember 2013 to seek membership in the EAEU. As is well known, the latter is le-
gally incompatible with certain parts of the envisaged AA, in particular, as far the 
establishment of a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) is con-
cerned. It is, for instance, not possible to abolish customs tariffs within the 
framework of the DCFTA and at the same time apply the common customs tariff 
applicable within the EAEU. In order to overcome this legal incompatibility, the 
EU-Armenia CEPA does not include any commitments regarding bilateral tariff 
liberalisation and reaffirms a general reconfirmation of WTO principles. Never-
theless, also without the DCFTA part, the EU-Armenia CEPA remains a very am-
bitious and detailed agreement with commitments in a wide range of areas such as 
justice, freedom and security, environment protection and climate change, trade 
and trade-related matters, transport etc. Hence, it may be regarded as an associa-
tion agreement lite, which opens the gates to a strengthened institutional and legal 
relationship between the EU and Armenia2.  
Significantly, such a relationship is formally compatible with Armenia’s EAEU 
membership taking into account that Article 114 of the Astana Treaty allows 
EAEU members to conclude international agreements with third parties as long as 
they do not contradict the purposes and principles of that Treaty3. Proceeding 
from the observation that the EU-Armenia CEPA does not entail any commit-
ments concerning tariff liberalisation or standardisation in contravention to EAEU 
                                                          
1 The text of the agreement is available at: 
https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/37967/eu-armenia-
comprehensive-and-enhanced-partnership-agreement-cepa_en  
2 The notion ‘association agreement lite’ is borrowed from H. Kostanyan and R. Gira-
gosian, ‘EU-Armenia Relations: Charting a Fresh Course’, CEPS Research Report No. 
2017/14, November 2017.  
3 The text of the Astana Treaty is available at: 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/kaz_e/WTACCKAZ85_LEG_1.pdf  
Overcoming Legal Incompatibilities and Political Distrust: the Challenging …  38
rules, there is no problem from a legal point of view. It is noteworthy that also at 
the political level, Russia and the EU explicitly acknowledged Armenia’s foreign 
policy as well domestic policy choices illustrating that their divergent neighbour-
hood paradigms should not necessarily result in a ‘zero-sum’ game1.  
At the other end of the spectrum, the recent developments in Moldova are a sig-
nificant test case for the further development of EU-EAEU relations. This country 
has concluded an association agreement, including a DCFTA, with the EU, which 
fully entered into force on 1 July 2016. At the same time, Moldova pursues a spe-
cial relationship with the EAEU, which is based upon the conclusion of a Memo-
randum of cooperation and the acquisition of an observer status in May 20182. 
Pursuant to Article 109 of the Astana Treaty, this implies that Moldova may be 
present by invitation at meetings of the EAEU bodies and may receive non-
confidential documents from these bodies. It does not include any decision-
making powers but entails a loyalty obligation in the sense that it is obligated to 
refrain from actions that could harm the interests of the EAEU and its member 
states. Whereas the precise implications of this obligation remain rather unclear, 
the granting of an observer status to Moldova is a remarkable evolution particular-
ly because the suggestion of former Ukrainian President Yanukovych to obtain a 
similar position for Ukraine within the (at that time) Eurasian customs union of 
Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan (the so-called 3+1 formula) had been firmly re-
jected in the past. Hence, both the evolutions of relations with countries such as 
Armenia, Moldova and Kazakhstan point in the direction of an increased differen-
tiation in the framework of the broader EU-EAEU relationship. This offers certain 
opportunities. For instance, the process of legislative approximation under the 
EU-Armenia CEPA may open the door to a broader process of approximation be-
tween the EU and the EAEU. Of course, there are also significant challenges in-
volved. The domestic situation in several EaP countries remains rather fragile and 
the upcoming parliamentary elections in Moldova scheduled for November 2018 
may provide another test case for stability in the region.  
                                                          
1 See, on this issue also: R. Dragneva, L. Delcour and L. Jonavicius, ‘Assessing Legal and 
Political Compatibility between the European Union Engagement Strategies and Mem-
bership of the Eurasian Economic Union’, EU-Strat Working Paper Series No. 7, No-
vember 2017.  
2 See: Decision of the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council, 14 May 2018, available at: 
http://www.eurasiancommission.org/ru/nae/news/Pages/14-05-2018-3.aspx  
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In any event, it appears that a certain level of engagement between the EU and the 
EAEU seems unavoidable. This is particularly the case with regard to technical 
issues such as product standards and SPS requirements. Constructive consulta-
tions on regulatory convergence at technical level may help to solve these issues 
and may be regarded as ‘confidence building measures’. Taking into account the 
lack of trust between the parties after everything what happened in the recent past, 
one cannot realistically expect a formal engagement between the EU and the 
EAEU in the near future. In order to proceed, the EAEU needs to deal with its 
own internal development. Only when it has further developed into a genuine 
rule-based legal order, the option of a formal bilateral relationship with the EU 
could be put on the agenda. In the meantime, some pragmatic form of cooperation 
and dialogue may be helpful even though the failed trilateral dialogue between the 
EU, Russia and Ukraine regarding the implications of Ukraine’s DCFTA illus-
trates that this is not an easy exercise.  
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EUROPEAN UNION – EURASIAN ECONOMIC UNION:  
POTENTIAL FOR COOPERATION 
 
The interaction between the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the European 
Union (EU) is a highly crucial issue both for political and for academic research 
due to significant role of regional integration in the contemporary international 
system and growing cooperation between various regions1. 
 Should we set cooperation against competition? Cooperative competition or 
competitive cooperation would be a very positive scenario for the EU-Eurasian 
Union relation, if only competition is fair, without artificial barriers, which are 
mainly political and geopolitical. In the dialogue with the European Union Russia 
has proposed and consistently promoted equal and mutually beneficial coopera-
tion together with the idea of a common economic and humanitarian space from 
the Atlantic to the Pacific. Practical cooperation between the EAEU and the EU 
could become an economic basis for the implementation of such a project. It 
would allow to avoid a choice either/or, when the country “in-between” is actually 
faced with an alternative: either with the EU or with Russia – both/and looks 
much better2.  
                                                          
1 Zaslavskaya N. The problems of the EU-EAEU interaction//Upravlencheskoe konsulti-
rovanie, 2017 available at: https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/problemy-vzaimodeystviya-
eaes-i-es (Accessed on 10 June 2018) 
2 Ayvazyan A. “Signing the EU-Armenia Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership 
Agreement”. Analytical Report ʋ 23, 2017 (ʋ96) available at: 
http://instituteofeurope.ru/images/uploads/analitika/an96.pdf (Accessed on 10 June 
2018) 
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The high degree of economic complementarity and the adherence to the uniform 
trade rules based on WTO standards ensure the necessary conditions for stable 
and transparent contacts between the EAEU and the European Union. It is clear 
that the EU example has been and remains a model for Eurasian economic inte-
gration. In the process of constructing the Eurasian Economic Union, its Member 
States are interested to apply all the best European practices adjusted to their own 
national realities. Thus, the similar principles of market liberalization form today 
the basis of both EU and EAEU models – new trade flows; freedom of movement 
of goods, services, capital, labor; improvement of quality of life through perfect-
ing quality of goods and services; establishing an institutional system, which is 
independent of the Member States; elaboration of common rules and monitoring 
their application. 
Public as well as business community of the EAEU Member States have no objec-
tions against internal norms and standards harmonization, upgrading inefficient 
standards to the level of the advanced ones, health and labour protection, etc. 
Therefore, it seems that the economically European and Eurasian regions are in-
terested in cooperation, because they successfully complement each other. How-
ever, two of the integration project still cannot find a basis for cooperation. As 
Natalia Zaslavskaya shows, there is a number of obstacles1.  
௅ Conceptual differences. From the EU side, Wider Europe and European 
Neighbourhood Policy give main initiative to the European Union, and perceive 
the countries of the Eurasian region as the objects of EU policy. On the contrary, 
Russia has interpreted “the Greater Europe” as a “common space from Lisbon to 
Vladivostok” with the possibility of implementing common economic and other 
projects. The same idea is a basis for the “integrating integrations” promoted by 
Alexander Lukashenko, the President of Belarus, and the TRANS-Eurasian part-
nership supported by the Eurasian Economic Commission (EEC). 
௅ Political disagreements. There exist different approaches to the situations 
inside the Eurasian region (Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Ukraine), as well as out-
side the region (Syria). It seems that political and economic issues could be sepa-
rated, if to focus only on common interests, take pragmatic decisions and promote 
                                                          
1 Kondratieva N. The EU-EAEU relations: peculiarities of the contemporary 
stage//Sovremennaya Evropa, N 3, 2018. 
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trade relations, without paying attention to political differences. However, the re-
ality demonstrates that it is not true. Russia has attempted to establish EAEU-EU 
cooperation in 2015. The Position Paper on the EAEU, which outlined the views 
and possible forms of cooperation, was handed to the EU Commission. In the re-
sponse letter, the EU leadership noted that the European Union takes a decision on 
the possibility of cooperation on the basis of wider political context and imple-
mentation of the Minsk agreements. So in this case the EU conditionality princi-
ples hinder the constructive approach to cooperation. 
௅ Institutional problems. On the part of the EU, there is a lack of understand-
ing ௅ which official or institution negotiate with in the EAEU. Europeans believe 
that the Eurasian project is developing mainly due to the support of Russia; there-
fore, fundamental negotiations are likely to be conducted not with the colleagues 
from the EEC, but with the Russian leadership. That is why in 2015 the President 
of the European Commission J. - C. Juncker sent a letter dealing with communica-
tion between the regional integration blocs to President Vladimir Putin, and not to 
the EAEU institutions1.  
Actually, the EU-EAEU cooperation should not be subject to any conditionality. 
In fact, the EAEU existence has become an objective reality that is difficult to ig-
nore. Wider competencies that have been transferred to the EAEU, modify condi-
tions of foreign trade operations for the EU companies in such areas as customs 
and tariff regulation, technical regulation, protection of internal measures, phyto-
sanitary and veterinary regulation. That is why the establishment of direct links 
between the European Commission and the EEC would be of practical benefit. 
The EU partners show interest in cooperation with the EEC on regulatory issues 
(standardization and technical regulation) at the expert level. 
The Eurasian Union and the EU Member States 
However, for the EU Member States, the situation is different. In the medium 
term, the development of bilateral ties with the EU Member States might be more 
beneficial for the EAEU. They have already demonstrated interest in bringing 
                                                          
1 Zaslavskaya N. The problems of the EU-EAEU interaction//Upravlencheskoe konsulti-
rovanie, 2017 available at: https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/problemy-vzaimodeystviya-
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closer integration processes in the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasia. A number of im-
portant events have recently proved this interest. The meeting between the Eura-
sian Economic Commission and the Foreign Ministries of Austria and France took 
place at the EEC Commission’s HQ in Moscow. “Vienna process 2017” was 
launched; Thessaloniki Forum took place in September 2017. “Eurasian Economic 
Forum: in Search of New Balanced Relations” was held in Verona, where the cur-
rent developments in the EAEU and the prospects for Eurasian economic integra-
tion were discussed. Worth mentioning is the Joint Declaration on the cooperation 
between the Government of Greece and the EEC on 24 June, 2017, which pro-
vides for cooperation on a broad economic agenda while considering obligations 
of Greece as the EU Member State. 
Therefore, in general, the contacts are sufficient. Initially, they serve to inform the 
EU business about the Eurasian Economic Union activities: application of sani-
tary, veterinary and phytosanitary measures, public procurement, financial mar-
kets, intellectual property, trade and competition policy, antitrust regulation. In 
2016, the President of Kazakhstan N. Nazarbayev launched the initiative – to hold 
an international conference in Brussels with participation of the high-ranking offi-
cials. The aim of this proposal was to find possibilities for interaction between the 
EAEU and the EU. Regrettably, it remains unrealised.  
The Organsation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) can become a 
framework for productive contacts via its Platform for Cooperative Security, as 
this European organization includes both EU Member States and the EAEU. In 
this regard, it is important to develop the dialogue on regional and sub-regional 
integration and cooperation in the relevant OSCE structures, as well as the devel-
opment of Eurasian transport links and corridors. For example, for the EAEU it 
looks very attractive to connect its transport infrastructure with the Trans-
European corridors No 2 and No 9, as well as with the Eurasian corridors “East-
West” and “North-South”1. Besides, joint EAEU-OSCE projects might be devel-
oped on digital transport corridors, digital industrial cooperation, traceability of 
                                                          
1 Preiherman Y. Infrastructure Connectivity and Political Stability in Eurasia// Valdai Pa-
per ʋ 85, 08.05.2018 available at:http://valdaiclub.com/a/valdai-papers/valdai-paper-
85-infrastructure-connectivity/ (Accessed on 30 July 2018) 
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products, goods, and on harmonization of digital infrastructures, creation of zone 
docking digital infrastructures1.  
The EAEU and its Members are interested to strengthen further the regulatory 
framework for cooperation with the EU candidate countries and European-
perspective states of the Western Balkans in areas where this does not contradict 
their EU integration commitments. It seems that such an approach would be bene-
ficial for those states; it would allow them to pursue a multi-vector trade and eco-
nomic policy, without sacrificing their interests and their choice in favor of join-
ing the EU. The most relevant example is Serbia, which is interested in the free 
trade deal with the EAEU. This new free trade agreement is supposed to replace 
older bilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), which Serbia has with Russia, 
Belarus, and Kazakhstan and expand the market for its products to Armenia and 
Kyrgyzstan that is beneficial for Serbian economy. However the EU does not 
demonstrate enthusiasm towards Serbia’s plans and intentions in this direction 
and, on the contrary, worries about several points ௅ is this unified trade regime 
compatible with the SAA between the EU and Serbia? Taking into consideration 
relevant issues stemming from the accession negotiations, is the unified trade re-
gime with the EAEU compatible with the candidate country status of Serbia?2  
The normal businesslike relations presuppose discussing the issues of concern and 
searching for the way out; but the confrontational agenda would suggest the un-
pleasant choice: either with the EU or with the Eurasian Union. 
It should be borne in mind that the EAEU Member States pursue fully independ-
ent foreign policy, as well as external trade with third countries in relation to ser-
vices, establishment and activities of legal bodies and investments. In accordance 
with the Treaty on the EAEU, supranational regulation covers external trade poli-
cy of the Union Members only in respect of trade. 
                                                          
1 Minasyan K, Minister for Internal Markets, Informatization and ICT. Eurasian Econom-
ic Commission. EAEU Digital Agenda. Vienna, 22 January 2018. 
  available at:https://www.osce.org/chairmanship/373513?download=true (Accessed on 
30 July 2018) 
2 European Parliament. Parliamentary Questions.  Serbia and unified trade regime with 
EAEU available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//TEXT+WQ+E-2016-005020+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=pt 
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Bilateral cooperation between the countries of the Eurasian Union and the EU can 
involve much wider range of spheres than trade in goods, and, as a rule, no con-
flict arise with the EAEU law. In addition, Member States will coordinate their 
external economic initiatives with each other. The examples are the EU-
Kazakhstan’s Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (2015) and EU-
Armenia’s Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (2017) that take 
into account their obligations to the EAEU. 
The EAEU states need more diversification in their external relations, not only 
with the EU, but also with China, Iran, the Arab countries etc. At the same time, 
among the Eurasian economic integration priorities there is a study of the options 
for interconnection between the Eurasian Economic Union and the Silk Road 
Economic Belt (SREB) or One Belt, One Road (OBOR). The Agreement on 
Trade and Economic Cooperation between the EAEU and China as well as the 
interim FTAs with China and Iran were signed at the Astana Economic Forum in 
May 2018. FTA between the Eurasian Economic Union and Vietnam has already 
allowed to increase trade turnover by 36%. In the long term, these agreements 
could serve as the basis for a new integration framework – the Great Eurasian 
Partnership, which is designed to harmonize interaction in the regional multilat-
eral institutions. 
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